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Introduction 
In this chapter we focus on how to use insights from behavioural theory in the process of impact 
assessment of policy proposals focusing on the European Union (EU). At the outset, we reason that 
different types of bias exist in the process of policy-making, including biases in the minds of those 
who are carrying out an impact assessment of a given proposal. We then focus on the case of biases 
affecting the analysis of the non-intervention option. We argue that EU policy-makers’ biases can be 
reduced by modifying the cognitive architecture of the IA process and by using training in ways that 
encourage awareness and henceforth a culture of regulatory humility. 
Over the last decade, the European Commission has developed an integrated approach to impact 
assessment of policy proposals – legislative or not. The impact assessment process is now a major 
step in the development of proposals by the European Commission. Recently, the European 
Parliament has invested in analytical capacity to work dialogically with the Commission and to carry 
out impact assessment studies of major amendments of the legislative drafts. Extant literature has 
established that the EU impact assessment system is, comparatively speaking (for example, in 
comparison to the systems of the 28 Member States and the United States [US]), sufficiently robust 
and comprehensive in the coverage of different categories of costs and benefits (Fritsch et al., 2013; 
Renda, 2011; Radaelli, 2009; Wiener and Alemanno, 2010). 
In the debate of how to conduct impact assessment and train policymakers, there are calls for 
integrating the insights of behaviour science into policymaking and design regulatory options that 
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take into account the various biases that affect citizens’ responses (Alemanno and Spina, 2013; John, 
2013; John et al., 2013; Jones et al, 2013; Sunstein, 2011; Van Bavel et al, 2013; Vandebergh, Carrico 
and Schultz, 2011). But policymakers have a mind too, and therefore their own choices can be biased 
(see for example Montgomery, 2011). The starting point for this chapter is the potential impact of 
one over-arching bias – the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The proposition is that this illusion – 
which leads humans to over-estimate their competence and ability to control outcomes – may be 
particularly damaging when the tendency to regulate is institutionalised. Specifically, while the EU 
impact assessment process obliges policymakers to consider the status quo option (non-
intervention), this is rarely ever selected. 
We should be clear: we do not claim that cognitive biases explain the preference for public 
intervention. There are different political and economic justifications for intervention. An 
organisation can also deliberatively decide to intervene because there is a regulatory obligation or a 
commitment made by elected politicians. Further, policy-makers can deliberatively manipulate IA 
procedures towards interventionist choices. If this is so, cognitive biases have no role to play since 
the organisation is not misdiagnosing the facts; rather it is manipulating them. Our angle is different: 
we are interested in increasing policy makers’ awareness of ‘regulatory humility’ (Dunlop and 
Radaelli, 2015b). We believe this should be encouraged among policy-makers, and specifically that 
the option of not using public intervention (so called ‘do nothing’ option in IA) be given due 
consideration – whether it is rejected or not. The classic policy-making literature has always pointed 
toward the limits of policymaking and policymakers (notably, Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Simon, 
1956; Vickers, 1965: chapter 8; Wildavsky, 1979: especially part 2). The increased complexity of the 
policy environment, the difficulty of getting evidence into policy, and greater clarity about human 
biases have all led to a re-discovery of these limitations. The result has been a renewed call for 
regulatory humility and humble decision-making (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b; Etzioni, 1989, 2014). 
Essentially, we bring these insights about regulatory humility into the field of impact assessment, 
with the EU as our empirical reference, and develop our suggestions on how to de-bias policy-
makers. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In section one, we set up the proposition that EU policymakers 
are especially susceptible to an illusion of control. Then we explore what can be done to mitigate a 
pre-eminent bias. We outline two categories of solutions. In section two we look at how the IA 
system in the EU can be implemented and amended in ways that ‘go with the grain’ of cognitive 
biases (Dolan et al, 2009: 7). Here, we accept the reality of that policymakers often operate in ‘fast’ 
mode (Kahneman, 2011). Rather than try to re-wire the policymaker’s mind, we focus on re-wiring 
the context within which they work to ensure that what is automatic to them is also beneficial to 
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policymaking. In short, how can we nudge EU policymakers to explore the ‘do-nothing option’, and 
indeed all policy options, with humility about the control they can exercise? Section three takes a 
slightly different tack. Here we focus on how policymakers can be exhorted to engage in more ‘slow’ 
thinking about the biases they carry. Such reflection – we argue – can be actively encouraged by 
appropriate training techniques and content. We explore the possible teaching tools that can be and 
are being used - including in-class behavioural experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
of how some of these ideas can be taken forward by the Commission. 
 
Section 1: What Prevents the EU from ‘Doing Nothing’? 
In his masterpiece on policy-making, The Art of Judgment (1965), Sir Geoffrey Vickers defines policy 
action as a product of policymakers’ contextual reality judgments – their understanding of the 
institutional world in which they operate and rules and procedures that underpin that – and their 
judgments – the cognitive biases they hold: 
‘Facts are relevant only in relation to some judgments of value and 
judgments of value are operative only in relation to some configuration of 
fact’ (Vickers: 1965, p. 40). 
Thus, to understand policymaking, is to recognise how these two realities intertwine to produce 
action and practices. Consequently, we argue that the contextual and prevailing values of the EU 
may intertwine to produce a propensity toward taking policy action rather than selecting the ‘do 
nothing’ option. In short, it produces a situation in which regulatory humility may be in short supply. 
What is the EU’s contextual reality? What is the policy context in which ‘doing nothing’ is 
considered? What structural and institutional factors influence how IA is conducted? Deciding if, 
when and how to intervene are fundamental in all governance systems. The EU however poses some 
specific challenges. Control here is not simply a matter of whether policymakers should decide to ‘do 
something’ about a policy problem in analytical terms. There are of course legal principles at work, 
especially competence and subsidiarity, with their own relationship with IA (for details, see 
Meuwese, 2008). Subsidiarity applies to determine whether the EU or the Member States are 
competent in the areas of ‘shared competence’. Thus, the subsidiarity principle relates to WHO 
should act in relation to a given policy problem, whilst IA concerns WHAT should be done and only 
comes into play at the EU level if the EU is in principle competent. Logically, there could be policy 
domains where the EU is competent to act but the IA concludes that this is not the case, having 
considered the specific features of the policy problem. Equally, we could reason that the IA supports 
the non-intervention option even in domains of shared competence where the EU is competent by 
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dint of subsidiarity. Although logically distinct, legal principles and IA analysis are related and in 
practice the views of the Commission on subsidiarity (e.g. think of a case where the Commission 
believes it should intervene because of subsidiarity arguments) constrain the usage of non-
interventionist option in IA. 
Some controversies confirm that IA analysis is blended with wider legal and political arguments – 
and not always with the best results.  Some years ago the Commission looked at insurance 
premiums from the perspective of gender equality, and concluded, in the IA, that doing nothing 
would perpetuate imbalances. Frank Vibert (2004) criticised the Commission for having decided to 
intervene in a field where market forces ‘correctly’ appraise the different risk coefficient of men and 
women, and argued that there were no grounds to bring in a gender perspective on the economics 
of setting insurance premiums at work in the Member States. By opting to intervene, was the 
Commission making the wrong economic assessment, or was it pushing the boundaries of 
subsidiarity politically – or both? 
If there is a sort of in-built structural bias toward intervention, its roots are not in legal principles or 
IA standards. Regulatory theory (Majone, 1996) argues that the Commission is a supra-national 
bureaucracy that has a structural preference for regulation, given the constraints it encounters in 
activating other policy instruments like taxation and expenditure. In a sense, regulation is the 
essence of this bureaucracy.  
To sum up then, the overall mis-diagnosis of non-interventionist options may result from the 
application of legal principles, inaccuracies in economic analysis contained in IA, or the wider 
political roots of the EU regulatory state. We cannot deal with all the three causes, especially 
because they differ markedly: some are structural, some are contingent. Given our focus on IA, it is 
better to focus on contingent causes – bearing in mind that the context is more complicated and has 
structural properties. Let us assume that policy-makers involved in a given appraisal of policy options 
have already absorbed their fair load of bureaucratic culture (the Commission as regulatory 
bureaucracy as suggested by regulation theory) and legal views on competence and subsidiarity. We 
are left with more contingent or proximate causes involves in the biases affecting intervention and 
non-intervention. At this point, the question becomes: what of the values and cognitive biases that 
mediate how policymakers approach public policy choice?  
The starting point is that as humans all policymakers, whether in the EU or elsewhere, can suffer 
from over-confidence in their ability to control events (Armor et al, 2002; Taylor and Brown, 1994; 
Langer, 1975). Ellen Langer (1975) famously demonstrated this ‘illusion of control’ experimentally, 
confirming the central hypothesis that people struggle to distinguish between events determined by 
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chance and those determined by skill. This is true even in situations where exercising skill cannot 
affect the outcome. Second, people have genuine difficulty in distinguishing between skill- and 
chance-related situations. These are often closely related in people’s experience. For example, there 
are elements of skill in chance situations such as dice games where participants can learn the odds 
(1975, p. 324). And so, ‘when a chance situation mimics a skill situation, people behave as if they 
have control over the uncontrollable event even when the fact that success or failure depends on 
chance is salient’ (1975, p. 315-316). The result is an illusion of control which hinders humans from 
understanding their limited impact on outcomes and conditioning influence of a wide range of 
specific biases. 
Policymakers are required to understand that not all variables can be known, nor can their 
implications understood; they work in a context where skill is mixed with chance. But, if they are 
biased by an illusion of control, they cannot fully appreciate the impact of chance and may struggle 
to identify the ‘limits of the regulable’ (Vickers, 1965: chapter 8). 
This is the cognitive starting point for policymaking in the EU. The particular EU context (described 
above) combines with the illusion of control to create a policy-making environment in which 
cognitive biases may be masked and policy action favoured. Hinting at the socialisation effects of this 
context, Lord Cockfield was fond of saying that the attitude of the EU regulator was ‘if it moves, 
harmonise it!’ (cited, amongst others, in McGee and Weatherhill, 1990: 583, see also Vibert 2005). 
Indeed, even if we discount this political argument, the illusion of control on its own is sufficient to 
generate an under-estimation of the benefits of non-intervention. The question we address in the 
rest of the chapter is what can be done to address this potential blindness to bias. 
The following two sections suggest some ways ahead. Inspired by Kahneman (2011), we explore two 
ways forward for EU policymakers – working with the biases to change behaviour fast and raising 
policymakers’ awareness through reflection – changing their minds slowly. 
 
Section 2: Using Prompts to Guide Policymakers in the ‘Fast’ Lane 
This section is dedicated to guiding policy-making in the cognitive fast lane. To work out how we 
might go with the grain of the illusion of control, we need to go back to why humans (and so 
policymakers) are motivated to control in the first place. The fact that ‘[M]ost people hold overly 
positive views of themselves and their ability to effect change in the environment’ (Taylor and 
Brown, 1988: 21) is usually taken as indicative of psychological well-being. Humans believe that 
control helps prove our competence (Langer, 1975, p. 323-324; White, 1959). As we take action, our 
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perception of control increases as do our levels of psychological comfort (Langer, 1975, p. 323). The 
challenge in policy-making is to make the IA process in general and consideration of the do nothing 
option in particular activities which goes with the grain of the strongest cognitive biases. Indeed, as 
we shall see, that is the very logic behind the inclusion of the do nothing category in the first place; it 
exists to encourage policymakers to treat non-intervention as a positive choice. Yet, we know that IA 
in the EU could be more refined (Renda, 2015) and that the selection of the do nothing category 
rarely occurs. 
The nudge proposition is that we can counteract this illusion of control and the risk of automaticity, 
by restructuring the policy-making environment. Behavioural theory reveals a huge array of biases 
supported by varying depths of evidence. The UK Cabinet Office captures nine biases with the ‘most 
robust’ effects in its influential 2009 report with the mnemonic title – MINDSPACE (Dolan et al, 2009: 
pp. 7; see Table 1) – whose influence policymakers most need to understand. Here, we take each of 
these biases in turn to see how the IA system is designed to take account of them and might be 
amended further still. Essentially, we are concerned with the reforms that can be made to IA that 
restructure policymakers’ cognitive architecture. 
 
Table 1: MINDSPACE Biases and Policymakers 
Illusion of control Policymakers … 
Messenger listen to experts and professional peers 
Incentives avoid losses and emphasize the baseline 
Norms observe professional socialisation 
Defaults overate precedence 
Salience attend selectively and confirm pre-existing beliefs 
Priming are susceptible to cues from the environment 
Affect make associations based on emotional responses 
Commitments seek to make and keep public promises 
Ego are motivated to act to feel good about themselves 
Source: Adapted from Dolan et al (2009) 
 
The first bias concerns the fact that ideas ‘do not float freely’ (Risse-Kappen, 1994); rather, they are 
carried by messengers (Cialdini, 2007). The identity and qualifications of the messenger informs our 
perception of the importance of what is said. Critically, we lend more weight to the advice of those 
who can lay claims to authoritative expertise on an issue or whose background resembles our own. 
Consider the power of an individual scientific adviser, her evidence is routinely given greater weight 
than that offered by the lay person (Wynne, 1996; Jasanoff, 2003). That heavier weight emanates 
from the credibility she has been given by her peers – most commonly in the form of professional 
7 
 
distinctions; research funding and career progression (Allchin, 1999). In IA, the power of external 
experts is usually harnessed in relation to evidencing individual aspects of policy options. This is 
necessary of course; policymakers need specialist inputs. However, where the opportunity to give 
evidence comes mid-way through the IA process – i.e. once the problem has been defined – 
policymakers’ preferences may be set. To counter the illusion of control the decisional process 
would benefit from incorporating expert advice at a much earlier stage’ e.g. by inviting experts or 
‘critical friends’, who have civil service background but have retired from the bureau, to comment 
‘upstream’ in the IA process (Stirling, 2005). Highly regarded messengers should be invited to 
comment on how the questions are framed, not only on how they might be answered. 
We can think about the messenger bias in relation to IA in a different way. Rather than taking advice 
from a small number of identifiable experts, policymakers can also draw upon the wisdom of 
anonymous crowds (Surowiecki, 2004; Sunstein, 2006), for example by using information markets 
that correct errors made by individual experts (Sunstein, 2005). Surveying large groups of unnamed 
experts, stakeholders or citizens offers one means to explore the unthinkable – rejecting policy 
action – in a way that carries minimal reputational damages for those involved should their advice 
later appear naïve of ill-considered. Such informational supply tools address the messenger bias, and 
reduce the possibility of groupthink (Janis, 1972), while still going with the grain of control illusions. 
Policymakers still exercise choice but they do so with the knowledge that experts have been free to 
express their opinions about the merits and pitfalls of inaction as well as interventions.  
The next bias concerns how humans respond to incentives. It is known that we respond to 
incentives using mental shortcuts. One of the most powerful is the desire to avoid losses (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984). How does this interact with IA? Policymakers are incentivised to consider the do 
nothing option alongside all others. In many ways, the design of IA suits loss aversion bias. Cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) may reinforce our tendency to fear loss more than we value gain. Since it is 
easier to calculate costs than it is benefits (Harrington, Heinzerling and Morgenstern, 2009) and 
given that humans define losses and gains relative to a ‘reference point’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), if no such reference point exists for gains or it is unclear or 
notional the tendency to lend more weight to fully calculated losses may be stronger. We know for 
example that people are influenced more by nominal – i.e. numerical – values as opposed to 
notional or actual values (Ert and Erev, 2013; Raghubir and Srivastava, 2002). We can hypothesise 
that where the numerical magnitude of a policy option can be calculated loss aversion may be more 
evident. 
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Yet, the analytical context in the EU is not so straightforward. The following scenario is instructive. In 
his analysis of the first batch of EU IAs, Vibert notes that even where the net benefits (from an 
intervention) were left un-quantified – i.e. policymakers knew only the costs – the Commission never 
selected the do nothing option (Vibert, 2004: 9). The issue here is that in order to perceive loss 
accurately (and so be averse to it), policymakers must be certain that they understand both the costs 
and benefits. Yet, the quantification of benefits is complex and lags behind the quantification of 
costs; in 2011 58.42 per cent of Commission IAs quantified benefits as compared with 88.12 per cent 
cost quantification (CEPS IA database; Fritsch et al, 2013). In such circumstances, a clear calculation 
of loss cannot be made; this may push policymakers toward the default of taking action. In short, it is 
possible that the evidential base of IA in the EU (and indeed the UK
1
) frustrates the power of loss 
aversion and creates the conditions for the illusion of control to drive action. 
Evidence from the United States suggests that achieving parity in the calculation of benefits and 
costs is possible (Cecot et al, 2008) and may go some way to harnessing the power of loss aversion. 
Of course, once we are able to calculate loss, the impact of loss aversion will be mediated by the size 
of the loss itself and in particular how this compares with the current situation. This emphasizes the 
importance of how the baseline – which acts as the reference point – is framed and calculated in the 
IA process. 
The third powerful bias explored concerns the power of social norms. In short, humans are 
influenced by the actions of others and ‘herding’ behaviour is common (Schultz et al., 2007). In a 
social setting this may take the form of people joining a queue even when they do not know what is 
it for. In the world of IA, we can think of policymakers conforming to professional norms of the 
bureau. These norms may be especially powerful because their observation is often materially 
rewarded in terms of career progression, salary etc. The most famous bureaucratic norm is budget 
maximisation (Niskanen, 1971) – where intervention correlates positively with increased size and 
power of a department and with the individual prospects of civil servants. Again, this is one of the 
norms that IA processes and tools such as CBA are designed to counter. As has been noted already, 
without an accurate understanding of the costs and benefits of action, the biases toward 
intervention and control can go unchecked. 
Moving beyond calculation, how might we go with the grain of social norms? What norms can be 
mobilised to counter the illusion of control in the IA process? New public management norms such 
as cutting ‘red tape’ can be mobilised to trigger reflection amongst policymakers. Given that norms 
become more powerful if they are personal, the IA process could usefully include prompts for 
                                                          
1
 In 2010, UK IAs quantifying costs and benefits were 80.4% and 57.1% respectively (Fritsch et al, 2013: table 2). 
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policymakers to review what was saved by their department, or even their policy team, in previous 
years through regulation reduction (for an example of this see BIS, 2012). 
Linked to social norms, the human tendency to rely on defaults typifies Kahneman’s fast thinking 
(2011; see also McKenzie, Liersch and Finkelstein, 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Where there 
are pre-set categories, we are more likely to select one of them than to question them or create our 
own. While perhaps the best-known tool is actually an ex post one – the sunset clause which creates 
legislation with an expiry date – the inclusion of a do nothing option in IA is designed to prevent 
policymakers from simply going with the flow. What more can be done to the policy-making flow 
that generates reflection on the limits of control and pitfalls of intervention ex ante? The IA process 
could be usefully augmented with questions relating to whether any horizon-scanning has been 
conducted that may suggest trade-offs from the decision or whether a post-decision evaluation has 
been considered and when this might take place. By asking such questions, policymakers may not 
ultimately reject the default option but it provides one way to structure the ‘flow’ of IA in a way that 
may stimulate reflection about the potential results of a policy decision (whether that is an 
intervention of not) a few years down the line. 
In 2001, when he was Administrator of the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 
academic risk analyst John D. Graham pioneered the introduction of ‘prompt letters’ – a procedure 
whereby OIRA is able to propose that an agency consider a new regulation or reconsider an existing 
one. The impact of these in the US has been welcomed (Graham, 2008). Such prompt letters offer 
one way for the fast thinking of the policymaker to be slowed down by the oversight body and to 
disrupt reliance on defaults. Until 2011, the European Commission’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) 
enjoyed the power to issue such prompts (article 6 of the former Rules of Procedure) but this power 
has been scrapped without explanation (Alemanno and Meuwese 2013). 
Beyond defaults we have the matter of salience – our attention is drawn by what is relevant to us. 
Humans are vulnerable to ‘cognitive dissonance’ or confirmation bias – we process information 
selectively. We rationalise or ignore evidence which disconfirms what might prove us wrong 
(Festinger, 1956). This goes to the heart of the illusion of control – where we are over-confident 
about evidence that supports our pre-existing views because it is easier to encode. Going with the 
grain of this to counter the illusion of control requires that evidence which challenges assumptions is 
made easier to understand and harder to ignore. The IA evidence gathering process could be 
amended to require that the same evidence be framed in a variety of ways with the aim that it 
challenges the cognitive ‘anchors’ that guide policymakers. 
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A further dimension of salience concerns the disproportionate attention paid to unusual memorable 
events and images (Kahneman et al., 1993). The tendency for policymakers to take ‘knee jerk’ action 
in the wake of trauma is well known in government and extensively theorised in political science 
(Better Regulation Executive, 2006; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The resulting legislation is often 
poorly considered (most famously see Baldwin, Hood and Rothstein, 2000 on the UK’s 1991 
Dangerous Dogs Act) and difficult to reform. Given that traumatic events inject urgency into policy-
making, because they are usually unexpected and tragic, going with the grain of this bias is both 
difficult and potentially undesirable. We should steer clear of artificially conjuring-up an attention 
grabbing event (Dolan et al, 2009). Rather, one possible solution is to understand that the salience of 
an event will diminish over time as it becomes less easily recall in the policymaker’s (and citizen’s) 
mind. Requiring that policymakers consider the inclusion of post-decision evaluation in policy 
options (including doing nothing) offers one way to harness the perspective brought by the passage 
of time. 
Humans can be sub-consciously primed to act in particular ways (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971). 
We each encounter priming most frequently in everyday life through the words, smells and visual 
stimuli used in marketing. In public policy, similar processes are at work. For example, we can think 
about the influence of stakeholders and key interest groups in policy-making – how they frame and 
present their arguments may have a powerful influence in determining the ‘boundaries of the 
possible’ in minds of policymakers (Majone, 1989). Hindmoor (2009) provides an insightful example 
in his case study on the policy response to the 2001 foot and mouth (FAM) outbreak in the UK. Here, 
the National Farmers’ Union’s (NFU) early and close access to government officials enabled them to 
successfully persuade against the use of emergency cattle vaccination. 
Working with the priming bias requires that more messages get through to the bureau from the 
external policy environment early on (see the earlier discussion on messengers). Here, humble 
policy-making means that a single group or idea is not allowed to dominate without challenge. 
Again, IA encompasses a tool that can enable that: consultation. Yet, we know that consultation 
exercises can become dominated by a small group of actors who are often the best resourced 
(Dunlop et al, 2012), hence we need to open up consultation processes and encourage pluralism. 
Digging further into human sub-conscious, behavioural theory illustrates the role of affect and 
emotions on actions (for a summary see Finucane et al., 2000). For example, the fear of regret is one 
of the most powerful drivers of human action. To avoid the negative emotions that accompany 
making a ‘wrong’ decision, humans tend to rely on precedents – what was successful / not 
unsuccessful last time? In organisational decision-making, this is the essence of what Simon 
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famously called ‘satisficing’ (1956); policymakers aim for decisions that are ‘good enough’. The 
emotional rewards of incremental policy-making also bring rewards in policy terms – most obviously 
relative stability for those stakeholders who ‘shape’ policy and citizens who ‘take’ it (Lindblom, 
1965). Yet, fear of going beyond the status quo also carries its own risks – where the desire to 
control and produce predictable results may mean missing a potentially innovative solution. 
The logic of IA works against emotion in general, and fear in particular. Lerner and Tetlock (1999) 
report results of an experiment where participants are required to justify their decisions – for 
example in using tools such as IAs – they are rewarded with positive emotions for rigorous policy 
appraisal. Where it is implemented fully and overseen vigilantly, IA processes may act as 
accountability tools which may counter the most negative consequences of affect. 
Behavioural theory has established another cognitive bias concerning the importance of honouring 
public commitments (for example, Staats, Harland and Wilke, 2004). We are loathed to break 
promises. Indeed, we make them with the deliberate intention of binding ourselves to a particular 
course of action. The desire among policymakers – as individuals and collectively – to be consistent 
with their commitments is strong. A recent example of this phenomenon is the UK implementation 
of EU-set targets on first generation biofuels. Even though the government accepted an emerging 
scientific consensus that the production of food crops into biofuel increased CO2 emissions, its public 
commitment to the target and promises made to the nascent UK biofuel industry led to the 
implementation of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO). Though institutional forces 
made policy reversal difficult, the psychological dimension was central to the Department for 
Transport’s (DfT) decision to stick with the planned course of action (Dunlop, 2010). 
Much of this desire to be consistent is driven by the need for credibility and accountability – backing 
down on commitments results in a very public loss of both. This desire to stay true to one’s word can 
be used to policymakers’ advantage if part of the contract they make involves remaining open to 
future review and evaluation. Post-decision evaluation in the case of biofuels did not result in policy 
reversal but rather a reduction of targets. Though the policymakers in this case anticipated that this 
would be the course of action, the absence of any commitment to remain open to new knowledge at 
the time of the IA made the DfT appear inconsistent and focussed on controlling policy failure. 
The final bias considered by MINDSPACE (Dolan et al, 2009) concerns ego – we act and think about 
ourselves in ways that make us feel good. In policy-making, this bias is perhaps exemplified by credit 
seeking and blame avoidance (Hood, 2011). Where a decision has resulted in policy success, 
departments and policymakers seek credit and, where things do not go according to plan, external 
forces or other actors are held responsible (Miller and Ross, 1975). Such tendencies are also 
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institutionalised in the complex and multi-layered structures of governments – none more so than 
the EU, where there is no shortage of actors who can be implicated in success and failure. This might 
written into the DNA of government, but the misinterpretation of outcomes and events that ego 
encourages frustrates policy learning. For sure, policy-making is usually too complex to be able to 
identify a single hero or villain. But achieving a broad understanding of what parts of the policy-
making system have and have not worked as expected is possible and important if successes are to 
be replicated and mistakes avoided in the future. 
Again, ex post policy evaluation offers a way ahead. Dunlop et al (2012) have shown that even in the 
absence of a post-implementation evaluation, we can still identify sets of conditions that contribute 
to certain types of IA – political, instrumental, symbolic, dialogic. By pairing an IA with its policy 
evaluation partner, we can take this further and piece together the necessary and sufficient 
conditions – i.e. recipes – that lead us to more or less accurate policy-making. Such learning is 
‘double-loop’ (Argyris and Schön, 1978) in that it generates lessons that will not simply allow 
policymakers to better understand the policy options selected but will tell them something about 
the fundamental decision to intervene and the level of control they have exercised (through policy). 
The dividends for the human ego are obvious; the benefits for policymaking and society are even 
greater. 
 
Section 3: Creating Reflective and Mindful Policymakers in the ‘Slow’ Lane 
Responding to the behavioural sciences is not simply a matter of accepting and working with 
policymakers’ biases by amending the choice architecture. For good governance to become self-
sustaining we require ‘mindful’ (Langer, 1989) policymakers with the ability to and who are in the 
habit of reflecting on how their ‘appreciative systems’ (Vickers, 1965) mediate professional practice. 
We must accept and embrace the fact that the policymaker is a sentient being not Pavlov’s dog! 
(1927/1960). Thus, we must also attend to the information that policymakers have about biases. 
Behind every IA process are professional policy officers. While we know that, in 2009, 90 per cent of 
OECD countries reported that they provide some form of IA training (OECD, 2009).. Since 2006, the 
Secretariat General (SG) of the Commission has run central training programme on IA. This has been 
supplemented by other DGs with their own courses (for example, in DG Enterprise external 
consultants are used). Between 2007-2013, around 15% of IA officers received this training (private 
communication with SG official, June 2014). Similarly, while they may be aware of the behavioural 
sciences agenda and some of the better known cognitive biases, EU policymakers have not yet 
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received instruction on the role these may play in policymaking (van Bavel et al., 2013). This state of 
affairs is understandable. IA has only been part of EU governance for the last decade, and 
behavioural science is even newer to the policy scene. Our interest here is in proposing examples of 
training that can be, and have been, incorporated into IA training courses and into practitioner-
focussed Masters in Business (MBA) and Masters in Public Administration (MPA) programmes. 
Training courses that are designed to inform policymakers and change their thought processes – 
rather than simply restructure behaviour – offer a way to generate longer-term engagement with 
the regulatory humility agenda. This long-term promise is rooted in the potentially powerful 
professional socialisation effects that can be generated by training (Kirkpatrick, 1959) – the herding 
effect of social norms at work! 
Before outlining a variety of training options, we must first state their purpose. Essentially, training 
enables practitioners to access their ‘slow’ thinking capacity. Such capacity is especially important 
for policymakers. As Schön (1983) argued thirty years ago, becoming an effective professional 
requires more than technical rationality and the ability to react to the decision-making context; 
professionals must be able engage in reflective thinking about their world and place therein. 
Reflection concerns the ways in which we subject our own thoughts and actions – possible and 
enacted – to consideration. We can go further than this; reflexivity takes us deeper into the self and 
addresses the emotional dimension of reflection that speaks to the very heart of human biases – 
what is it that public administrators as human beings with values, feelings and boundaries bring to 
decision-making? 
Reflection takes us back to the fundamental principles of the Art of Judgment (Vickers, 1965). 
Reflection makes the appreciative system stronger – for Vickers, this system works via feedback, 
determining which facts are relevant, and how they fare in relation to our norms. Interestingly for 
our argument, Vickers observes that:  
‘Change both massive and unpredictable makes inconsistent demands for 
rigidity on the one hand and flexibility on the other and poses the most 
basic policy choice of all, the choice of what to regard as regulable’ 
(Vickers: 1965, p. 99). 
How can we train civil servants and policymakers to engage in reflective thinking about their 
cognitive biases? We argue for two pedagogic mechanisms. Behavioural theory can simply be 
incorporated into training using classic methods of case studies and academic literature to initiate 
reflection. Such lectures and small group work encourage participants to reflect on what they have 
read, heard and discussed about the limits of control. Second, more innovative methods are 
beginning to appear in MBA (Masters of Business Administration) and MPA (Masters of Public 
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Administration) training – specifically involving the use of in-class experiments – that may enable 
reflexive engagement (see Bazerman, 2005 on managerial applications). Kolb’s (1984) seminal work 
on experiential learning suggests that by creating opportunities for students to reflect by doing, the 
learning process is individualised, and concepts move from the abstract to the concrete. We now 
propose a variety of ways in which the nine MINDSPACE biases can be illuminated using traditional 
and experimental teaching tools. 
Messenger bias is most commonly demonstrated using framing experiments. In their studies of issue 
framing, Kahneman and Tverksy (1979) found that the manner in which the same information or 
outcome is represented impacts upon the decision that is made. Small changes in this framing can 
produce different decisions about the issue. By presenting similar groups of policy practitioners with 
the same information communicated by different people – for example, an expert, a practitioner 
peer, an interest group representative – we can separate out the impact of who is communicating 
evidence from the evidence itself. This is relatively easy to resource and can be modelled on 
evidence submitted for a real IA. 
The earlier discussion on human responses to incentives emphasised the importance of creating a 
level analytical playing field where loss could be nominally calculated – thus harnessing the power of 
loss aversion. But, we can also encourage policymakers to reflect on how cognitive shortcuts 
mediate their analysis of CBA. Our European policymakers should not consider costs and benefits as 
objective categories. Rather, they could usefully be exposed to the wider literature that emphasises 
the subjectivity embedded in CBA analysis itself and its interpretation (notably, Ackerman and 
Heinzerling, 2004; Driesen, 2005; Parker, 2003). Ackerman and Heinzerling’s retrospective 
application of CBA provides an especially powerful set of case studies where lead would not have 
been removed from gasoline in the 1970s, the Grand Canyon would have been damned for 
hydroelectric power and workplace exposure to vinyl chloride would not have been outlawed in 
1974. 
It may not always be appropriate or possible to conduct in-class experiments. Yet, the impact of 
cognitive biases can be explored by presenting classic cases to students. In a recent article, Rowe 
(2013) uses insights from Asch’s (1956) classic experiments on group conformity to explore the 
behavioural dynamics of small group teaching. The experiment provides an opportunity for the 
practitioners to reflect on the power of group norms. In that case, practitioners were invited to 
reflect – through individual learning logs – on how group dynamics influenced decision-making in the 
teaching group. However, the logic can easily be extended to policy-making situations where 
departments within an organisation develop particular ways of doing things. 
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The need to think beyond defaults is an enduring theme in public administration literature. One 
particularly useful model that can alert policymakers to the wider implications of going with the flow 
is that of risk tradeoffs. Created by John D. Graham and Jonathan B. Wiener, tradeoff analysis 
requires policymakers to address the possibility of four countervailing risks being created by taking 
policy action (1995): 
1. has the same risk transferred to new population? 
2. has the old problem been substituted by a new one affecting the same population? 
3. has the risk been transformed creating an entirely new problem for a new group of people? 
4. has risk been offset to create a similar one for the same group? 
Inviting practitioners to explore these questions in relation to their own experiences of policy-
making offers one way to stimulate reflection and heighten awareness of bias. 
Similar simple teaching methods can be used to highlight the salience of the new. Specifically, 
availability and recall biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) can be illustrated by introducing 
policymakers to basic probability calculation. 
Practitioners can be exposed to the power of priming and affect using the types of framing 
experiments outlined earlier. For example, the same news story can be delivered to practitioners in 
different ways – one simply read by a newsreader and the other with the reading accompanied by 
dramatic background images. The expectation here is that the group primed with emotive images 
will assume a higher risk of the event happening again (see Bazerman, 2005). 
One way to explore the power of commitments is explore why policymakers might make 
commitments to their publics. There are various arguments about why humans make promises that 
they know will tie their hands. For policymakers, such declarations act as accountability and 
transparency tools (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999) and are central to the identity of a professional 
policymaker. However, policymaking also requires agility and the willingness to change course. Cases 
studies that highlight the difficulty of terminating or reversing failing policies offer one way of 
highlighting the potential pathologies associated with commitment bias. 
Finally comes ego – how can we teach policymakers that they behave in ways that make them feel 
better about themselves? This is a sensitive area where course instructors risk alienating their 
practitioner students! Yet, the role of ego gets to the heart of the wider illusion of control that 
threatens to undermine regulatory humility. Dunlop and Radaelli (2015b) broach the subject with 
MPA participants using a mix of case study, conceptual teaching and an in-class experiment. They 
first generate awareness about the idea of regulatory humility using the case study of legal scholar 
and activist Larry Lessig. Lessig argues it is necessary to protect the world against irrational 
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legislation controlling the internet. Specifically, he is concerned that future regulatory interventions 
aimed at increasing transparency in and control over the online world may at best be futile, and at 
worst produce unanticipated harms (Lessig, 2010). Practitioners are taken through this case study 
and encouraged to discuss the idea of regulatory humility and its roots in the classic policy and 
administration literatures. Deeper reflection is then encouraged by conducting one of Langer’s 
(1975) illusion of control experiments with the practitioners. Based around a lottery, the experiment 
demonstrates that even though this is entirely a chance situation, those practitioners who selected 
their lottery number – i.e. had exercised a choice – were more confident they would win. Course 
evaluations and assignments suggest that this combination of teaching tools produced extensive 
reflection amongst practitioners (see Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b) and provides a useful template. 
 
Conclusion 
The current discussion on the role of behavioural science in the EU, well represented by the 
Introduction to our volume, revolves around the issue of integrating the insights of cognitive and 
behavioural economics into EU policymaking. In the field of impact assessment, this has spawned 
emerging concerns about whether benefits and costs are objective entities or are refracted by 
perceptions and heuristics of those most affected by them. At the same time, there is an on-going 
debate on the alleged reluctance of the Commission to take into serious consideration the option of 
non-intervening. This is not a new concern; since the early 2000s there have been critiques of the 
artificiality of some doing-nothing analyses. In this chapter, we have argued that the various biases 
that underpin the illusion of control produce neglect of policy abstinence. 
There is room for optimism however. The EU context may indeed be favourable to behaviourally-
informed intervention. Despite the fact that the institutionalisation of IA in the EU pre-dates the 
influence of behavioural theory in policymaking, there is much in the design of IA that goes with the 
grain of cognitive biases – notably the emphasis on calculating losses. The challenge is to ensure that 
analyses and processes are rigorously implemented. Amendments that re-structure some aspects of 
the IA choice architecture are also required. One recurring theme in this chapter has been the need 
to structure-in ex post policy evaluation (Commission, 2013; OECD, 2014) 
Policymakers should also be trained to think, in slow mode, about the potential impact of their 
cognitive biases. The ideas and examples suggested in this chapter are in many ways tentative but 
they do suggest options for the future. First, it would be interesting to extend the use of conceptual 
and experimental teaching to samples of policymakers from the Commission. If the Commission has 
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a structural predisposition for regulatory intervention, this should show up in the behaviour of its 
officers. 
Second, the Commission has called for evidence on how to re-formulate its guidance on impact 
assessment. This guidance (the impact assessment guidelines) should certainly include information 
on how those who are regulated respond to policy interventions. To some extent, whole segments 
of the impact assessment procedure, such as problem definition, regulatory options, benefits and 
costs, and macro-economic estimations should be calibrated and modified by using the insights of 
the behavioural sciences (Alemanno and Spina, 2013; Van Bavel et al., 2013). The interest in 
behavioural science is key to the current efforts of the US and European governments to moderate 
‘irritating’ burdens and ‘perceptions of administrative obligations’. And yet, guidance should also be 
clear and informative about the various forms of bias that occur at the level of the officers preparing 
the impact assessment. Their minds may trick them in the same way it tricks the citizen. Guidance on 
impact assessment should tell the policymaker how to recognise and test for bias, among other 
things by mentioning the risk of illusion of control. By combining training and guidance, governments 
have a chance of pushing the agenda for regulatory humility beyond nudging. 
Third, think of the implications for training the Commission’s officers. There is a market for training 
regulators, with courses on specific topics, including modules on IA (Allio, 2015). The Commission 
has its own training modules, with input from private consultants, officers from the Secretariat 
General, and the Joint Research Centre. These modules include law and economics, and elements of 
public policy analysis. They have case studies and testimonies from Commission's officers who 
developed impact assessments in the past and share their experience. Our approach suggests a new 
way to train on IA and policy formulation. Some fascinating insights on policy-making can be taught 
by using methods that involve the ‘subjects’ of the experiment in a reflection about their own 
illusions and biases.  
An important aim of our volume is to discuss the challenges of integrating the sciences of nudging 
into the legal system of the EU. The impact assessment process is at the core of this system because 
it is there that policy proposals are appraised and developed. Indeed the impact assessment 
document is published on the same day the Commission publishes the draft proposal (for legislation 
or for a white paper or a Communication). It is challenging to think of integrating experiments in 
training modules for officers who develop EU legal acts and policy in general, but also exciting to 
think about the possibilities ahead. 
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